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DON'T MESS WITH "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, the Gay-Rights Movement in America has
slowly, but steadily, gained political strength and prominence. Pushing for
outright acceptance of their lifestyle, homosexuals' have naturally
attempted to use their political and economic resources to attack those
institutions that they feel have historically discriminated against them the
most. One of those institutions is a branch of the United States Govern-
ment: the Department of Defense. The "discrimination" being combated
is the long-standing ban on gays serving in the Armed Forces.2
This steady assault on the ban reached its zenith during the 1992
presidential election. Presidential candidate Bill Clinton made lifting of the
ban a plank in his political platform. Clinton met with stiff resistance when
he attempted to remove the ban in the early days of his Presidency. The
most notable resistance came from Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and
the several branches of the Armed Forces. After protracted negotiations,
a compromise was finally reached.
The result of those negotiations was a policy that is now commonly
referred to as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue." Under this policy,
the ban is not completely lifted. Indeed, open homosexuality or homosex-
ual conduct is still a service-disqualifying condition. Still, the new policy
has radically altered the military's approach to homosexuality. The policy
has three prongs. Under the first prong, "Don't Ask," those involved in
recruiting or retention of service members are forbidden to question
individuals about their sexual orientation.3 The "Don't Tell" prong
compels homosexual service members to refrain from openly discussing
their sexual orientation The "Don't Pursue" prong prohibits command-
ers from conducting "witch hunts" to root out possible homosexuals.5
1. This Comment uses the term "homosexual" to refer to both gays and lesbians. It is
used solely for convenience and is not intended to offend any member of the gay or lesbian
community.
2. All references in this Comment to "Armed Forces" or "military" refer to the United
States Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard.
3. Department of Defense Directive 1304.26, para. B-8(a), at 2-5 (1994) (Qualification
Standards for Enlistment, Appointment, and Induction, in Memorandum from Les Aspin,
Secretary of Defense, to Secretaries of the Military Departments et al. (Dec. 21, 1993) (on file
with author)).
4. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
5. Policy Guidelines on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces, in Memorandum
from Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, to the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and
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The new policy is a disappointment to both members of the military
establishment, who are convinced it went too far, and gay-rights advocates,
who feel it did not go far enough. Because of the new policy's similarities
to the prior ban, it is possible that it may not survive a constitutional
challenge.6 What both of these groups fail to realize is that, at the present
time, the new policy is a perfect solution.
Not only does the policy take into consideration, as it must, the mission
requirements of a military force undergoing unprecedented change, both
nationally and internationally, it also offers greater protection and
opportunities for patriotic homosexuals who wish to serve their country.
Also, this policy can easily withstand as strict a constitutional analysis as
the one used to uphold the original ban. Most importantly, if carried out
properly, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy could finally answer the
question of whether homosexuality is truly incompatible with military
service.
Part II of this Comment examines the separate place the military holds
in our society, as well as the origins of the outright ban and "Don't Ask,
Don't Tell." It will also analyze the issue that should be the sole focus of
any discussion on the lifting of the ban: the possible effect overturning the
new policy and lifting the ban would have on our Armed Forces' ability to
effectively carry out their stated mission of winning wars. Part III
examines the results of constitutional attacks on the prior outright ban, and
the likely constitutionality of the new "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy.
Finally, it will argue that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" could be extremely
effective in altering the military's and society's present attitudes toward
homosexuality without jeopardizing the high standards of readiness and
morale required of our Armed Forces.
II. THE STATUS OF THE MILITARY AND THE HISTORY AND THEORY
OF THE BAN
The ban on homosexuals serving in the military is a long-standing one.
While the ban was originally based on unsound assumptions about the
abilities of homosexuals, valid concerns about the effects of open
homosexuality on military readiness still exist. This section will examine
the nature of military service, give a brief account of the ban's history, and
the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (July 19, 1993) (on file with author) [hereinafter Aspin,
July Memorandum].
6. Indeed, at least one federal district court judge has declared the policy unconstitution-
al. Able v. United States, 880 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
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examine some of the reasons for upholding a ban on open homosexuality.
It will also briefly outline the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy itself.
A. The Military's Separate Place in Our Society
The Armed Forces of the United States exist for one purpose and one
purpose only: winning wars.7 Because of this unique mission, the military
has had to evolve as a separate society, with a lifestyle and rules all its
own. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Schlesinger v.
Councilman, when it stated that "the military must insist upon a respect
for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life."9 It is vital
to grasp this distinction if one is to adequately understand what is truly at
issue in the current debate over the military's prohibition on the service of
homosexuals.
The military's unrelenting call for respect of duty, and utter need for
discipline, shape the day-to-day life of soldiers, sailors, airmen, and
marines. At any time, vast numbers of service members reside in open-bay
barracks or in cramped living areas on board ships or submarines. Privacy,
something treasured by most people, is simply inconsistent with the
exigencies of military duty, a fact recognized by anyone who has ever
served. Additionally, service members have little or no choice in their duty
station, and indeed, may be transferred anywhere, anytime the mission
requires it. Of course, these sacrifices pale when compared to the ultimate
sacrifice that these individuals may be called on to make: surrendering their
lives in combat, or even in peacetime.10
It should be noted that those who choose to enter the service willingly
surrender some of the protections offered by the Bill of Rights. The extent
to which the military is permitted to curtail these rights would most, likely
be viewed as unacceptable to the average civilian.
For example, while service members do enjoy Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, they are neverthe-
less constantly subject to "inspections" completely unsupported by
7. See, e.g., United States ex reL Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (stating that the
primary business of armies and navies is to fight wars).
8. 420 U.S. 738 (1975).
9. Ia at 757.
10. The peacetime sacrifices regularly made by members of our Armed Forces were
illustrated recently when four Army soldiers died from hypothermia after wading through
chilly, chest-deep swamps at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, while undergoing Ranger training.
The Rangers, an elite branch of the Army, are an all volunteer force. Four Army Rangers
Die in Training, ATLANTA I. & CONST., Feb. 16, 1995, at Al.
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probable cause.11 During inspections, a commander may fully examine
the barrack room and personal belongings of an individual service member.
It seems unlikely that the average citizens would grant their superiors full
access to their homes, or give them license to search their closets and
drawers for contraband.
Also, the Armed Forces have been found justified in restraining service
members' First Amendment rights to free speech,"2 free association, 13
and freedom of religion. 4 All of these permissible restrictions are based
on the Court's acknowledgment of the military's absolute need for
discipline and maintenance of morale and readiness. Restrictions on the
enjoyment of those rights are allowed when unlimited enjoyment of those
rights would unduly interfere with the military mission.'5
In order to ensure that the military is well equipped to deal with threats
to its ability to carry out its mission, Congress created a separate body of
law: the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Military law is specifically
tailored to reflect the needs and realities of military life.'6 All members
of the Armed Forces are subject to this law twenty-four hours a day, seven
days a week. 7 Through the Uniform Code of Military Justice, service
members are subject to administrative discharge proceedings, 8 court-
martial, 9 or even non-judicial punishment.2  Many of the crimes for
11. Inspections are conducted to "determine and ensure the security, military fitness, or
good order and discipline of the unit, organization, installation, vessel, aircraft, or vehicle."
MIL. R. EVID. 313(b).
12. See, e.g., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (noting that speech of service
members will be restricted if that speech "undermines the effectiveness of response to
command").
13. See, e.g., Blameuser v. Andrews, 630 F.2d 538,543-44 (7th Cir. 1980) (denying Army
Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) enrollment to member of American Nazi Party).
The military commonly places organizations and establishments off-limits to its service
members. David A. Schleuter, Gays and Lesbians in the Military: A Rationally Based Solution
to a Legal Rubik's Cube, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 393, 408 (1994).
14. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,510 (1986) (upholding military's ban
on wearing of religious apparel while in uniform); 10 U.S.C. § 774 (1988) (allowing service
members to wear some religious apparel).
15. Schleuter, supra note 13, at 406-07.
16. See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, 1984 at I-1 (1984)
(stating that the "purpose of military law is to... promote efficiency and effectiveness in the
military establishment ... ").
17. Aspin, July Memorandum, supra note 5, at 2; MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION:
HOMOSEXUALS AND THE RIGHT TO SERVE 85 (1993).
18. See, e.g., U.S. Army Regulation 635-200 (authorizing discharge for unsuitability or
misconduct).
19. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 830 (1988).
20. Id § 815. Commonly referred to as Article 15, non-judicial punishment allows
commanders to punish service members for minor offenses not warranting court-martial. Id
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which service members may be punished have no counterpart in the
civilian criminal justice system.?
Because of the military's overriding need for unquestioned obedience
established through discipline, and because of the great sacrifices voluntari-
ly made by its members, it is vital that any action which could adversely
affect the ability of the military to complete its mission, or the willingness
of its members to serve, be closely scrutinized.
B. The History of the Ban
Some form of prohibition on homosexuality or homosexual acts has
always existed in our Armed Forces. As early as 1778, an officer of the
Continental Army was drummed out of the service for committing
homosexual sodomy and perjury,? Still, the crime of sodomy was not
codified into American military law until 1917 through the Articles of War
of 1916 which deemed "assault with intent to commit sodomy" a felony?
Sodomy was originally defined as anal copulation between men or between
a man and a woman.24
When the Articles of War were revised in 1920, sodomy itself was
made a punishable offense z Additionally, the definition of sodomy was
broadened to proscribe oral copulation between men or between a man
and a woman.26 With the criminalization of sodomy, the expulsion and
exclusion of homosexuals from the service was a natural consequence.
Some of the original bases given for excluding homosexuals from military
service included the questionable findings of early psychiatrists that
21. See, e.g., id. § 888 (contempt toward officials); id. § 889 (disrespect toward superior
commissioned officer); id. § 892 (failure to obey lawful order or regulation).
22. RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY 11 (1993).
23. Id at 15. The offense was embodied in Article 93 of the Articles of War of 1916.
RAND CORP., SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY: RAND CORP.
OPTIONS AND ASSESSMENT 3-4 (1993).
24. RAND CORP., supra note 23, at 4 (citing Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward
Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical, and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL. L. REv. 55, 73 (1991)).
25. Davis, supra note 24, at 73.
26. RAND CORP., supra note 23, at 4 n.3 (citing MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL,
UNITED STATES 443 (1921)). The offense of sodomy is currently embodied in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988). That article states:
(a) Any person subject to this chapter who engages in unnatural carnal copulation
with another person of the same or opposite sex or with an animal is guilty of
sodomy. Penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the offense. (b) Any
person found guilty of sodomy shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
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indicated that a homosexual was "dangerous, ... [and] an ineffective
fighter."'27
Between World Wars I and II, the military more clearly formed its
attitudes and practices in regard to homosexuality.' On the basis of
biological criteria formulated specifically to identify homosexuals,
individuals possessing certain suspect characteristics were denied enlist-
ment.29 During this period, many soldiers found to be homosexuals were
given administrative discharges.30 Others were court-martialed for their
acts.3'
The advent of World War II had a profound impact on the status of
homosexuals in the Armed Forces. For the military to successfully
conscript an unprecedented number of troops, it was deemed necessary to
formulate a functional policy to exclude "sodomists," individuals who were
deemed unsuitable for military service.32 Additionally, military officials
were disturbed by the uneven application of the policy towards homosexu-
als among the individual branches.33 The formulation of this policy
continued throughout the war, resulting in a total of twenty-four revisions
between 1941 and 1945. 4 Two of the major changes that resulted were
the shift of focus from the "sodomist" to the homosexual, and a determina-
tion that homosexuals, if discovered, should be denied induction into the
service or summarily discharged.3
It was not until October 11, 1949, that a formal, unified policy
regarding homosexuality in the military was announced.3 6 The Depart-
ment of Defense memorandum setting out the policy stated the following:
"Homosexual personnel, irrespective of sex, should not be permitted to
serve in any branch of the Armed Services in any capacity, and prompt
separation of known homosexuals from the Armed Forces [should] be
made mandatory."37
This unified policy was first revised in 1959, when Department of
Defense Directive 1332.14 stated that individuals could be administratively
27. SHILTS, supra note 22, at 15.
28. RAND CORP., supra note 23, at 4.
29. Id.
30. Id. These discharges were normally less-than-honorable. Id
31. Id.
32. Id. at 5.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. (citations omitted).
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discharged if deemed to be "unfit" for service.38 This determination of
unfitness could be based on "sexual perversion," which included sodomy
and other homosexual acts?9 In 1965, precise rules for the process of
separating these individuals were outlined.' Service members in danger
of receiving a less-than-honorable discharge were given the opportunity to
present their case to a review board and to be represented by counsel.4'
This policy remained essentially intact through the Vietnam War and
most of the 1970s. Still, continuing inconsistency in the standards and
procedures related to the discharge of homosexuals, and numerous cases
pointing to the uneven application of separation proceedings and
discharges, prompted the Carter Administration to review the policy.42
In 1981, the new version of Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 flatly
stated that anyone who had "engaged in, [had] attempted to engage in, or
[had] solicited another to engage in a homosexual act" must be mandatori-
ly discharged.43 It also issued a statement that "homosexuality is incom-
patible with military service."'  The reasoning behind this conclusion was
stated succinctly in that directive:
The presence of such members adversely affects the ability of the
armed forces to maintain discipline, good order, and morale; to
foster mutual trust and confidence among servicemembers [sic]; to
insure the integrity of the system of rank and command; to facilitate
assignment and worldwide deployment of servicemembers [sic] who
frequently must live and work under close conditions affording
minimal privacy; to recruit and retain members of the armed forces;
to maintain the public acceptability of military service; and to
prevent breaches of security.4
This new directive also changed the military's policy regarding the
discharge of homosexuals. In the absence of other circumstances, including
violent acts, misconduct discharges were not required to be given.'
Service members discharged under the new policy amounted to a relatively
small group. For example, from 1980 to 1991, a total of 16,919 service
members were administratively discharged for homosexuality.47 While
38. Id. at 7.
39. id.
40. Id.
41. Ma
42. Id.
43. Id. at 8.
44. Department of Defense Directive 1332.14 (1981) [hereinafter Directive].
45. d.
46. RAND CORP., supra note 23, at 8.
47. Id.
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that number may seem high, discharges for homosexuality amounted to
only 1.7 percent of all involuntary discharges for that period.' This policy
remained substantially in effect until July 19, 1993.49
C. "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
In January of 1993, President Bill Clinton directed then Secretary of
Defense Les Aspin to submit a draft Executive Order that would end
"discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in determining who may
serve in the Armed Forces ..... I Secretary Aspin was told to carry out
this directive in a realistic and practical manner "consistent with the high
standards of combat effectiveness and unit cohesion...," required of our
military. On the basis of reports prepared by Rand's National Defense
Research Institute52 and an Office of the Secretary of Defense Working
Group,53 the Department of Defense formulated the "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" policy. The new policy came under immediate attack from
individuals on both sides of the debate.
The new policy first mandates that recruits will no longer be questioned
regarding their sexual orientation.' Similarly, individuals applying for
security clearances will not be subjected to this type of questioning." All
service members, however, are to be informed of the military's separation
policy that mandates discharge for homosexual conduct. 6 Commanders
will no longer be allowed to initiate investigations solely to determine a
service member's sexual orientation,57 but will be allowed to do so if the
investigation is based on "credible information that a basis for discharge or
disciplinary action exists." 8
The new policy also clearly defines what type of actions will be viewed
as "homosexual conduct." In addition to sexual contact between members
48. Id. at 8-9.
49. On that day, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced the military's new "Don't
Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy. Aspin, July Memorandum, supra note 5.
50. President's Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on Ending Discrimination
on the Basis of Sexual Orientation in the Armed Forces, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 112
(Jan 29, 1993).
51. Id.
52. RAND CORP., supra note 23.
53. Summary Report of the Military Working Group, contained in Memorandum for the
Secretary of Defense (1 July 1993).
54. Aspin, July Memorandum, supra note 5, at 1.
55. Id. at 3.
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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of the same sex, these actions include statements of one's sexual orienta-
tion, 9 public displays of affection between members of the same sex,6°
or marriage or attempted marriage to a member of the same sex.6' Still,
even a statement regarding one's homosexuality will only raise a presump-
tion that the individual desires, or intends to engage in, homosexual
conduct, a presumption which is rebuttable.6'
D. The Theory of the Ban-Possible Risks and Consequences of Open
Homosexuality in the Armed Forces
In an effort to counter the claim that homosexuality is incompatible
with military service, many plaintiffs challenging their discharge for
homosexuality have gone to great lengths to make their individual service
records an important aspect of the litigation.' Essentially, the argument
goes: "If homosexuality is incompatible with military service, how could I
have been so successful while I served?" This argument, which focuses on
the individual, is seductive, but utterly misses the point. It is homosexuality
as a lifestyle that is considered incompatible with military service. As the
Supreme Court stated in Turner v. Safley, "[w]hen accommodation of an
asserted right will have a significant 'ripple effect' on fellow ... [service
members], courts should be particularly deferential to the informed
discretion of [military] officials."'  This section will examine the ripple
effect that overturning all forms of prohibition on homosexuality would
have on the military community and its ability to carry out its mission. It
should be noted that the concerns expressed in this section stem solely
from the possible effects that an outright lifting of the ban would have on
the Armed Forces.
As a group, gays and lesbians have never been allowed to serve as
openly homosexual soldiers, sailors, airmen or marines. Although there are
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Aspin, July Memorandum, supra note 5.
63. See, e.g., Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1331 (9th Cir. 1988),
withdrawn, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (describing the discharged soldier as "one of [unit's]
most respected and.trusted soldiers"); Steffan v. Cheney, 780 F. Supp. 1, 5 (D.D.C. 1991) aff'd
sub nom. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that the discharged Naval
Academy midshipman was "academically... in the top ten percent of his class [and] ...
slated for one of the most prestigious assignments after graduation").
64. 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987). Turner dealt with the Court's balancing of two interests: the
constitutional rights of prison inmates and the complex task of running a state penal system.
Id. at 84-85. Similar interests are involved here: the balancing of soldiers' constitutional rights
and the complex task of running the United States Armed Forces.
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individual cases of homosexuals who were open about their sexual
orientation and still managed to avoid discharge, these are the exception,
not the rule.' Also, while the ability of homosexuals to serve as out-
standing service members is unquestioned, the actual effects that dropping
the prohibition would have on the military's combat readiness is simply
unknown. Several areas of concern are pressing and must be either
answered comprehensively, or at least explored more fully, before courts
jump headlong into the fray and overturn the new policy. The areas that
this section will examine include the privacy interests of heterosexual
service members, the exceptional medical needs of homosexual service
members, and the threat that open homosexuality poses to the recruiting
and retention of service members. These concerns are more practical and
more easily expressed than the concerns that many military officials raise
involving unit cohesion and combat effectiveness, vague terms that define
a unit's ability to wage war. While those concerns are certainly vital, this
Comment will not discuss the effect open homosexuality would have on
that aspect of the military's ability to fulfill its mission.
1. Privacy Interests of Heterosexual Soldiers
At the end of a work day, service members do not leave the installation
and re-enter civilian life. Many of them go to barracks rooms, large open-
bay barracks, or even sleeping berths on board ships. While service
members do enjoy the right of privacy, that right is necessarily diminished
in light of the exigencies of the military mission. The diminishment of that
right has not, however, extended to the removal of gender segregation in
the Armed Forces.' On military bases worldwide, separate living
quarters must be provided for male and female service members. Even in
the field, separate tents must be erected to accommodate men and women.
Gender segregation also extends to the military's prohibition on
members of the opposite sex occupying the same barrack room or using
the same bathroom facilities. It cannot be disputed that quartering men
and women together would constitute a violation of both sexes' right of
privacy.67 If males and females desired to share a barrack room, such a
65. SHILTS, supra note 22, passim.
66. The common sense reasoning behind gender segregation was discussed during
Senate debate on the new policy. 139 CONG. REC. S11,157-04, Sl1,190 (daily ed. Sept. 9,
1993) (statement of Sen. Coats).
67. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1988) (during
urinalysis, observer of individual providing sample should be of same sex); Rider v.
Pennsylvania, 850 F.2d 982 (3d Cir. 1988) cert. denied, 488 U.S. 993 (1988) (because hiring
female guards to oversee female prisoners was often necessary, hiring process did not
[Vol. 79:377
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living arrangement, even if purely platonic, would surely be viewed as
contrary to good morale and discipline. Military barracks are a natural
extension of a service member's daily life, and as such, must be maintained
in a professional manner. They are not college dormitories.
This prohibition takes on a strange twist when one attempts to apply
it to open homosexuality in a military context. Realistically, the military
would be forced to make a determination of whether to extend that
prohibition to forbid same-sex couples from occupying the same barrack
room. Additionally, the military would have to decide if they should give
any credence to the unwillingness of heterosexuals to be assigned to share
quarters with a service member sexually attracted to members of the same
sex. If forcing men and women to share a shower or a room is violative
of either sex's right of privacy, how can it seriously be argued that forcing,
for example, a heterosexual woman and a lesbian to shower together is not
equally violative of that same right?
Even an attempt to set up heterosexually and homosexually segregated
barracks would likely be insufficient to resolve concerns with the military's
standing prohibition on sodomy. In accommodating the concerns of all
service members, heterosexual and homosexual, the military would be
forced to accept assurances from homosexual service members that no
sexual relationship with their barrack mate would occur, a promise that
could possibly be broken. Moreover, even if the military was forced to
drop its prohibition on sodomy, the same concerns that arise in a
heterosexual male-heterosexual female barrack pairing would be valid if
raised in a homosexual male-homosexual male barrack pairing; morale and
discipline would likely be affected.
Assuming that the military could somehow come up with a scheme that
protected the privacy interests of all parties concerned, the scope of such
an undertaking would undoubtedly be extremely cost prohibitive. With the
intense ongoing debate over the funding of our Armed Forces, and the
budget cutting that the military has endured in the last several years, it
seems unlikely that any workable scheme that offers adequate protection
to all service members could be formulated.
2. Exceptional Medical Needs of Homosexual Soldiers
Many homosexuals have served in the military.68 Still, the previous
ban likely had the effect of discouraging many who wished to serve from
discriminate against male guards).
68. SHILTS, supra note 22, passim.
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entering the Armed Forces. For those who did enter, it is also likely that
the strict policy against homosexual conduct inhibited many of those
individuals from engaging in homosexual behavior. If the ban on
homosexuals serving in the military was lifted entirely, it is rational to
assume that more homosexuals would enter the service. Although it is
likely that a large percentage of homosexuals engage in a lifestyle quite
similar to that of the average heterosexual, it must also be recognized that
many homosexuals adopt lifestyles and engage in sexual practices that are
relatively uncommon in straight society.69
For example, research indicates that homosexual men engage in
significantly more sexual relationships than the average heterosexual
male.7' The results of one study involving 93 male homosexuals showed
the mean number of lifetime sexual partners for the subjects to be 1,422.71
The range for this particular group was from 15 to 7,000 partners.' It is
this behavior that frequently places homosexual men in a high risk group
for AIDS.73 Even awareness of the threat of AIDS has not conclusively
been shown to be effective in reducing the disease's spread. One report
stated that a large percentage of "homosexual men appear to be reverting
back to risky sexual behavior, threatening to undo gains made in halting
the spread of AIDS .... ."'
In addition to the threat of AIDS, the promiscuity of a significant
percentage of homosexual men places them in greater danger of contract-
ing other sexually transmitted diseases, and sustaining injuries unique to
their sexual practices.75 The increased demand for treatment that could
result from a large influx of members of a high risk group would wreak
havoc on the military community, a community that is dedicated to
providing complete medical treatment to its members.
Moreover, the military mission requires that its members not only
remain in an extremely high state of physical readiness, but also a high
state of mental readiness. Military life, by its very nature, is likely to
induce stress in any service member. Studies have shown, however, that
69. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 17, at 93, 97, 101.
70. Id. at 93.
71. Id. at 94 (citing J. W. Gold, Unexplained Persistent Lymphadenopathy in
Homosexual Men and the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 64 MED. 203 (1985)).
72. Id.
73. WELLS-PETRY, supra note 17, at 94-95.
74. Rebecca Kolberg, Safe Sex Relapse Poses AIDS Threat, UPI (June 22, 1990).
75. Roger A. Roffman et. al., Continuing Unsafe Sex: Assessing the Need for AIDS
Prevention Counseling, 105 PUB. HEALTH REP. 202-208 (1990) (high risk behavior included
unprotected oral sex, unprotected anal intercourse, fisting, (anal-fist contact) rimming, (anal-
oral contact) and shared sex toys).
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homosexuals are additionally subject to unique mental health concerns
stemming from the "emotional toll of secrecy, disapproval and, often,
internalized shame.... ,76 These concerns may be the reason behind
studies indicating higher rates of substance abuse among the homosexual
population,"7 as well as higher rates of suicide contemplation.78
If the military is to function effectively, it must be allowed the latitude
to "assure the enlistment of personnel free of medical conditions which
would cause excessive lost time from duty, medically adaptable to global
geographic areas and capable of performing duties without aggravation of
existing physical or medical conditions."79 If the studies regarding the
sexual practices of homosexuals and the medical and psychological
consequences of those practices are even partially accurate, they raise
serious concerns over the wisdom of removing the restrictions on open
homosexuality in the military.
3. Recruiting and Retention
The peacetime military is solely a volunteer force. Absent conscription,
it is vital that the military be able to recruit the best and brightest young
men and women to serve. Still, it is common knowledge that entering the
military means subjugating the needs and desires of the individual to the
needs of the group. Also, the level of expertise required of service
members if our military is to succeed in wartime demands unquestioned
obedience and rigid discipline. Convincing those talented individuals to
surrender so many of the freedoms enjoyed by the average American is
obviously a difficult task.
To attract these individuals, it is necessary that the Armed Forces
guarantee an environment that is morally acceptable to them. If unable to
guarantee that environment, consequences could be disastrous. If talented
individuals are unwilling to join because they fear, rightly or wrongly, that
the lifestyle they are entering will be offensive to their moral or religious
beliefs, military readiness suffers in two distinct ways. First, the number of
those willing to serve dwindles. Second, to make up for the loss of
76. Chris Anne Raymond, Addressing Homosexuals' Mental Health Problems, 259
JAMA 19 (1988).
77. Jay P. Paul et al., Gay and Alcoholic: Epidemiologic and Clinical Issues, 15.
ALCOHOL HEALTH AND RES. WORLD 151 (1991) (study showed that 30% of gay and lesbian
subjects were problem drinkers).
78. Raymond, supra note 76 (noting that a study of 1917 lesbians found that over 50%
of the group had contemplated suicide. Twenty percent of those individuals had attempted
suicide at least once).
79. Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp. 900, 905 (D. Minn. 1981).
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talented individuals, the military is forced to lower its entrance standards
to maintain adequate force levels.
Opinion polls conducted nationally' and among members of the
Armed Forces"' clearly show a negative attitude towards homosexuality
in general, and towards homosexuals in the military in particular. While
many would view society's negative perception of homosexuality as an
outdated notion based solely on stereotypes, an all-volunteer fighting force
does not have the luxury of ignoring public opinion. Indeed, it is likely
that many would see allowance of open homosexuality in the military as
tacit governmental approval of that lifestyle, a view that could do nothing
but damage the military's efforts to maintain its high recruiting standards.
The military's ability to retain skilled, senior service members could be
similarly affected. The loss of a large number of experienced leaders
would have a profound impact on the ability of the military to adequately
train and supervise its members.
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE BAN AND THE LIKELY
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Service members dismissed because of their homosexuality have often
attempted to have the military's ban declared unconstitutional. In their
quest to do so, they have employed several different theories including
substantive due process, violation of equal protection, and the deprivation
of their First Amendment rights. This section will first examine the status-
conduct dichotomy that has shaped many of the cases that have reached
the trial stage. It will then briefly explain the individual theories, and why
courts have generally been unwilling to apply any of them to the military's
ban. Finally, it will discuss the likely constitutionality of "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell."
A. Homosexual Status v. Homosexual Conduct
The military's pre-"Don't ask, Don't tell" policy on homosexuality
made discharge mandatory for individuals who had "engaged in, ha[d]
attempted to engage in, or ha[d] solicited another to engage in a homosex-
ual act."'  On its face, the policy did not seem to conflict with the
80. RAND CORP., supra note 23, at 438-50 (in polls conducted by different organizations,
percentage of those approving of homosexual lifestyle never exceeded 50%).
81. Id. at 451-62 (the percentage of male service members opposed to homosexuality
as a lifestyle or lifting the ban on homosexuals was consistently higher than the percentage
of females).
82. Directive, supra note 44.
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holding of Robinson v. California,8 a case in which the Supreme Court
declared it unconstitutional to penalize an individual based solely on her
",status., 84
Status has been defined as an attribute of a person that remains even
after that person has ceased to engage in any specific category of
conduct s Nevertheless, it is often difficult to determine where conduct
ends and status begins. It has been argued that status itself is proof that
the individual has engaged in homosexual conduct in the past, or is likely
to do so in the future.86 Still, an individual can claim to be a homosexual
although they have never and may never engage in homosexual conduct.
Indeed, in many cases involving discharge for homosexuality, the "status"
of the individual alone seemed to be the primary basis for that individual's
discharge.' The practical application of the ban forced courts to struggle
With this dichotomy.
Courts struggled because not all of the ways that a service member's
homosexuality comes to light necessarily involve prohibited homosexual
"conduct." Indeed, there are several ways a homosexual serving in the
armed forces can come out or be forced out of the closet. For example,
a service member could be discovered committing sodomy with a person
of the same sex. In that instance, the individual not only committed the
crime of sodomy, an offense punishable under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice, the individual also engaged in a homosexual act, an act
warranting mandatory discharge. Here, it is the conduct of the individual
that is prohibited and which serves as the basis for discharge. Discharges
involving such proved conduct were rarely challenged.
83. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
84. Id. at 666. Robinson dealt with a California statute that made it unlawful to be
addicted to narcotics. The defendant was arrested and charged not because of possession or
use of drugs, but because he had needle marks on his arms. At his criminal trial, the jury was
allowed to convict Robinson without specifying if he had been punished for unlawful conduct
as evidenced by the needle marks, or merely for his status as an addict. Id at 663.
85. Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional
Frontiers of Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 381, 395 (1994).
86. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom II"), cerL
denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
87. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Sec'y of the Army, 489 F. Supp. 964 (E.D. Wis. 1980) ("Ben
Shalom I") (challenging discharge of a lesbian drill sergeant who announced her sexual
orientation); Pruitt v. Weinberger, 659 F. Supp. 625 (C.D. Cal. 1987), modified, 943 F.2d 989
(9th Cir. 1991) (challenging discharge of a lesbian chaplain who had acknowledged her sexual
orientation); Steffan v. Cheney, 733 F. Supp. 121 (D.D.C. 1989), rev'd, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir
1990) (challenging discharge of Naval Academy midshipman who admitted he was gay after
being questioned by Academy officials).
88. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1988).
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Also, an individual might be seen engaging in a public display of
affection with a member of the same sex. Such displays of affection
between members of the same sex, including hand holding or kissing, can
obviously raise questions as to a service member's sexual orientation.'
Although these types of displays are not forbidden by the Uniform Code
of Military Justice, they can still be viewed as types of "homosexual acts."
Although not criminal, these actions are nevertheless "conduct," and
therefore constitute stronger proof of an individual's homosexuality.'
In both of the previous examples, some form of conduct was viewed as
proof of the sexual orientation of the service member. That conduct
normally fit neatly within the wording of the ban. Unfortunately, in most
of the cases brought by discharged homosexual service members, this
conduct did not occur. Rather, they identified themselves as homosexuals
through their responses to questions regarding their sexual orientation, or
through their on-duty or off-duty statements that they were indeed
homosexuals. Absent any proof of the service member having engaged in
prohibited conduct, it would seem intellectually dishonest to state that their
status was not at issue.
Nevertheless, most courts have been unwilling to find that a discharge
based even solely on an individual's statement that she is homosexual is
violative of the Supreme Court's edict in Robinson v. California. For
example, in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh91 (Ben-Shalom II), Miriam Ben-Shalom
was denied reenlistment into the Army Reserve, not on the basis of alleged
or proven conduct, but on the basis of her verbal acknowledgment of her
homosexuality.
Upholding the Army's action, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the admission of homosexuality alone was "compelling evidence
that [Ben-Shalom had] in the past and [was] likely to again engage in such
conduct."'93 That court also stated that the Army did not have to close its
eyes to the practical realities of what Ben-Shalom's statement indicated,
89. See, e.g., Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1003 (1990) (noting fact that the discharging commanding officer's suspicion had
been aroused when a naval officer was seen in company of known homosexual sailor. This
resulted in questioning as to the officer's sexual orientation).
90. Indeed, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy specifically prohibits any "[b]odily
contact [between service members) which a reasonable person would understand to
demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in [homosexual acts]." 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(f)-
(3)(B) (West Supp. 1995).
91. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom I"), cert. denied,
494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
92. ld. at 464.
93. Id.
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even in the absence of any proof of prohibited conduct.94 By allowing
evidence of status to substitute for evidence of conduct, the holding of Ben-
Shalom II indicates just how far courts were willing to go in their quest to
uphold the ban. While the status-conduct distinction seemed to be a
promising weapon against the ban, in many cases, courts managed to avoid
the prohibition on status-based penalties with regard to homosexuality.
B. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment essentially
prohibits the government's unequal treatment of persons who are similarly
situated.95 Traditionally, courts have been reluctant to strike down
legislation on equal protection grounds in deference to the complex and
difficult political process. In its efforts to limit the judiciary's second
guessing of legislative motives, the Court has fashioned various levels of
review under which classifications claimed to violate equal protection are
scrutinized.
The highest level, strict scrutiny, involves classifications that deal
specifically with "suspect classes., 9 6 Such classifications, .usually involving
race or alienage, are seen as inherently suspect. Because these classifica-
tions are generally regarded as relying on stereotypes, disadvantaging those
who are politically powerless, or attacking an individual based on some
immutable characteristic, they warrant the protection of strict scrutiny.97
If legislation is based on such a classification, or if it impinges on a
fundamental interest, the lawmaking body must show that the govern-
mental interest involved is "compelling."98 Moreover, it must prove that
the legislation is narrowly tailored to satisfy that interest.99 Only then will
the legislation be found constitutional. As a practical matter, an announce-
ment by a court that it is employing strict scrutiny essentially sounds a
death knell for the statute."°
94. Id.
95. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 14.1-14.3,
at 588-605 (4th ed. 1991) [hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA].
96. Id. § 14.3, at 576. Strict scrutiny can also be triggered if the classification impinges
on a "fundamental interest." Id. § 11.4, at 378-379.
97. lIt § 14.3, at 576.
98. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-17 (1982).
99. Id
100. Not since Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), has a statute subjected
to strict scrutiny survived. In Korematsu, Japanese-Americans were contesting a military
order excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast. The order was upheld
because of the exigent circumstances of World War II. Id. at 217-19.
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The next level of review, intermediate or mid-level scrutiny, is applied
in cases where the classification affects members of a quasi-suspect
class. 1' This class typically includes such distinctions as gender or
illegitimacy." z If subjected to this standard of review, the classification
must address an "important governmental objective,"'' 3 a lower standard
than the compelling objective requirement of a strict scrutiny analysis.
Additionally, the legislation is only required to be substantially related to
the important objective."  The constitutionality of legislation subjected
to this level of review is by no means a foregone conclusion.
The last level, "mere rationality," is applied to classification schemes
that affect neither suspect nor quasi-suspect classes. This level is the most
deferential to legislatures because it only requires that some rational
relation exist between the classification and the purpose to be achieved."'
Even absent some articulated rationale, courts will often supply one to
justify upholding the legislation. °6 The application of this level of review
generally assures the legislation's constitutionality.
If a "suspect" or "quasi-suspect" equal protection attack on the
military's ban on homosexuality was to succeed, homosexuals would first
need to be deemed a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Homosexuality seems
to meet several of the requirements. Arguably, homosexuals are subjected
to stereotypes, and the ban on homosexuals could be said to be based on
the stereotype of homosexuals as ineffective fighters."W Additionally,
many gay and lesbian rights advocates and members of the scientific
community have claimed that homosexuality is a genetic characteristic, and
101. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (application of intermediate scrutiny in a
gender discrimination case).
102. See id.; Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988) (identifying intermediate scrutiny as the
proper standard of review for legislation involving illegitimacy).
103. Clark, 486 U.S. at 461.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(holding that where individuals possess characteristics relevant to interests the state has the
authority to limit or advance, state need only show a rational means intended to reach a
legitimate end); High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 581
(9th Cir. 1990) (finding that homosexuality is not an immutable characteristic, and discounting
claims that homosexuals were politically powerless).
106. See Railway Express Agency Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (In
upholding regulation, Court conjectured at possible reasons state would pass a law forbidding
truck owners from selling space on the side of their vehicles for advertising, while still
allowing them to advertise their own business on their vehicles).
107. SHILTS, supra note 22, at 15.
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therefore immutable." s As a minority, homosexuals may also have a
justifiable claim that they are politically powerless. In spite of homosexual-
ity's seeming applicability to a suspect or quasi-suspect class qualification,
courts have traditionally declined to extend the application of that status
to homosexuals, disputing claims that homosexuals are politically
powerless,"° or that their sexuality is something beyond their own
choice.'
Absent a suspect or quasi-suspect class qualification, courts reviewing
the constitutionality of the military's exclusion policy consistently subjected
it to a mere rationality analysis, the most deferential standard of review.
Indeed, courts passing on the ban invariably found it to be constitutional.
C. Substantive Due Process
Rulings involving substantive due process have generally settled the
notion that the Fourteenth Amendment protects certain aspects of life and
liberty from governmental interference."' In order to warrant this
protection, the aspect of life or liberty that is sought to be protected must
be recognized as a "fundamental interest."'" One of these fundamental
interests is the right of privacy, a penumbral right that, while not specifical-
ly mentioned in the Constitution, has received limited recognition by the
Supreme Court."3
Attempts by homosexuals to have this right construed to protect same-
sex relations were effectively quelled by the Court in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,"4 a case involving a male homosexual's challenge to Georgia's
sodomy law. In reaching its finding that the right of privacy did not extend
to homosexual sodomy, 5 the Court held that the privacy interest
protects only behavior that results from a marital relationship, or at least
between members of the opposite sex."6 Because state marriage laws
108. Boyce Rensberger, Study Links Genes to, Homosexuality, WASHINGTON POST, July
16, 1993, at Al.
109. See, e.g., High Tech Gays, 895 F.2d at 574 n.10 (asserting that evidence of state and
local ordinances prohibiting discrimination against sexual minorities belied claim that
homosexuals were politically powerless).
110. Id. at 573 (stating that homosexuality is strictly behaviorial, and "fundamentally
different from ... race, gender, or alienage").
111. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 95, § 11.5-11.7, at 380-94.
112. See id. § 11.4, at 378-79.
113. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (stating that the "First
Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion").
114. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
115. Id. at 191.
116. 1d. at 190-91.
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typically prohibit members of the same sex from being married, it is
effectively impossible for participants in a homosexual relationship to enjoy
the protection reserved for legally recognized families.
Admittedly, heterosexuals, homosexuals, and bisexuals are all capable
of committing sodomy as it is typically defined. Unfortunately, the Court
never answered the more direct question of whether only homosexuals may
be penalized for committing sodomy, or if any person engaging in the
prohibited act may be charged, regardless of their sexuality or sex partner.
Had the right of privacy been found broad enough to protect the rights
of same-sex couples as it has traditionally protected cross-sex couples, it
would have been a powerful weapon against a military ban premised on
sexual conduct the military regards as criminal. Still, by finding that there
was no fundamental interest to engage in homosexual sex, the holding of
Bowers v. Hardwick effectively stifled the use of substantive due process
as a means of overturning the military's ban on homosexuality.
D. First Amendment
In addition to equal protection and substantive due process attacks,
opponents of the ban have suggested using the protections of the First
Amendment as a basis for overturning the prohibition. This theory rests
on two prongs. First, the First Amendment prevents the government from
inhibiting free expression based on the content of the expression,1 7
whether the expression is verbal (pure speech) or expressive conduct
(symbolic speech). 8 Second, the First Amendment inhibits government
action that intrudes on a person's right to associate with others for
religiously or politically expressive activities. Individuals discharged not
for homosexual conduct, but for admitting they were homosexual, have
claimed that the statement, "I am a homosexual," constitutes protected
speech, and cannot therefore be a basis for punitive action! 9 Courts
passing on this claim have generally held that because being homosexual
117. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 95, §§ 16.5-16.7, at 937-38.
118. See generally William E. Lee, Speaking Without Words: The First Amendment
Doctrine of Symbolic Speech and the Supreme Court, 15 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 495
(1991).
119. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 703 F. Supp. 1372 (E.D. Wis. 1989), rev'd, 881 F.2d 454 (7th
Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom II") (district court accepted argument that plaintiff's First
Amendment freedoms of expression and association were violated by Army Regulation
mandating discharge for individuals who verbally expressed their homosexuality. Because a
mere statement regarding one's sexual orientation could never be dispositive evidence of their
having engaged in homosexual conduct, that statement could not be a basis for punitive
action).
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is grounds for discharge from the Armed Forces, such speech constitutes
an admission, and is not protected speech.1 °
The associational prong could be implicated if individuals were
forbidden from forming support groups or clubs with homosexuality as
their focus. Still, courts have also recognized the military's power to limit
the associational rights of service members. For example, commanders
may declare areas or establishments off limits for service members.
E. The Likely Constitutionality of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
As the foregoing discussion has shown, courts have gone to great
lengths to defer to the military's decision to deny homosexuals access to
serve in the Armed Forces. Recently, however, several courts have
accepted some of the constitutional arguments previously raised by
plaintiffs attacking the military's ban on homosexuality. For example, in
Cammermeyer v. Aspin," a federal district court in Washington found
for Cammermeyer on the grounds that the policy violated both equal
protection and substantive due process." While this holding did not
extend suspect class status to the plaintiff, it held that the regulation was
based solely on prejudice, and therefore failed even a rational basis
review.123
Also, in Meinhold v. Department of Defense," the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld an injunction barring the Navy from discharging
Meinhold on the basis of his statement "I am gay.""l  The court,
however, limited its decision to the particular facts before it, refusing to
uphold the lower court's nationwide injunction on discharging homosexuals
under the new policy or to pass on the constitutionality of the new
policy,1
Based on the Supreme Court's tradition of deferring to Congress and
the Executive's control of the military, and the care taken by those
branches in formulating the new policy, as evidenced by the extensive
legislative history generated by the debate on the ban, "Don't Ask, Don't
Tell" will likely survive the "rational basis" analysis that has traditionally
120. Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Ben-Shalom II"), cert. denied,'
494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
121. 850 F. Supp. 910 (W.D. Wash. 1994).
122. lt at 929.
123. IL
124. 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994).
125. Id. at 1480.
126. Id at 1479-80.
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been applied to the military's ban on homosexuals." 7 Indeed, at least
one federal district court has declared the military's new policy constitu-
tional. 8
IV. THE LIKELY EFFECTS OF "DON'T ASK, DON'T TELL"
Serving as a member of the Armed Forces of the United States is not
a right; it is a privilege.29 With the advent of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell,"
homosexuals have now been given an unprecedented opportunity to serve
as members of the Armed Forces without the stigma of having to lie about
their sexuality during their military career, a barrier which prevented many
homosexuals from even entering the military and cost many of them their
careers upon reenlistment or application for a security clearance.
While homosexual conduct is still forbidden, the new policy does
discourage commanders from actively seeking out homosexuals absent
outrageous behavior that raises the concerns and suspicions of fellow
service members. Moreover, even a statement by an individual that she is
homosexual only raises a rebuttable presumption that she desires or
intends to engage in homosexual conduct, a presumption that the service
member is given the opportunity to rebut. By employing a modicum of
self-restraint and discretion, homosexual service members will now be able
to serve proudly in all branches of the Armed Forces.
Had the ban been lifted entirely, the military would likely have suffered
immediate consequences involving the drain of a significant number of
skilled soldiers, an increased unwillingness of civilians to volunteer for
military service, and a breakdown in society's view of its Armed Forces.
By implementing a policy that is sensitive to both the desire of homosexu-
als to serve as members of the Armed Forces, and the very real concerns
of service members and military commanders, the Clinton Administration
has struck an excellent balance.
127. Schleuter, supra note 13, at 430.
128. Thomasson v. Perry, No. 95-252-A, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11420 (E.D. Va. Jun.
8, 1995). Thomasson, a Lieutenant in the Navy, had openly announced his homosexuality.
At his administrative discharge hearing, he declined to produce any evidence that might rebut
the presumption that he had a propensity to engage in homosexual conduct. Id at *9. After
dismissing the plaintiff's equal protection, substantive due process and First Amendment
challenges to the new policy, the judge refuted Thomasson's claim that the presumption raised
by his statement was irrebuttable by noting that three individuals had already been successful
in avoiding administrative discharge by producing evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption. Id. at *35-*37.
129. E.g., Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296 (1911); Crawford v. Cushman, 531 F.2d
1114 (2d Cir. 1976); Pauls v. Sec'y of Air Force, 457 F.2d 294 (1st Cir. 1972).
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If the policy is implemented properly, it could have a profound impact
on society's perception of homosexuality and homosexuals in the military.
As more and more homosexuals enter the Armed Forces, the validity of
the concerns raised by military commanders will be put to the test. While
it might seem unfair to force homosexual service members to refrain from
engaging in their chosen lifestyle, they should recognize the possible
negative impact that their lifestyle could have on the ability of the military
to fulfill its mission. The military should never be used as a tool for social
experimentation or change.
V. CONCLUSION
With the advent of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," the military has finally
taken a long, reasoned look at its policy on homosexuals in the Armed
Forces. Unable to ignore the outstanding service records of thousands of
gay and lesbian service members, it has formulated a new plan that will
allow homosexuals thinking about entering the Armed Forces, and those
who are currently in uniform, to serve proudly. Due to the possible effects
that open homosexuality could have on the ability of the military to
complete its assigned missions, homosexual service members have been
asked to trade their civilian lifestyle for one that is wholly military until
they leave the service. This sacrifice, like all other sacrifices made by
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, is for the good of the United States
Armed Forces, and it should be made willingly.
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